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PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN TITLE ASSOCIATION
WITH COMMENTS ON THE SAME
Said association at its Omaha convention in 1923 con-
ridered Fifteen Proposals of recommendations to the several
states; to bring about uniformity and simplicity with refer-
ence to conveyances and titles to lands.
It would go without saying that simplicity and uniform-
ity of the laws as to conveyances and land titles is a thing
to be desired, but many attorneys and laymen who are not
connected with title and abstract companies, believe that
the adoption of the Torrens System of registering land titles
would conduce to the common weal. It is probable that the
fears of the Land Title Companies that such' legislation would
ruin their business, may be groundless, especially as the
experience of those states which have adopted the system
shows that the use of such a.system would come about very
gradually; and indeed it would seem to be desiraole that
it should be so, for the adoption of any such change is accom-
panied with more or less friction until its advantages come
to be appreciated. On the other hand might it not very
much increase the business of any given Land Tit:e Com-
pany for a generation or two, should they co-onerate with
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the pubic in trying to extend the use of the Torrens System
of registering land titles? But, be that as it may, it is
certainly desirable that the laws of the several states be as
simple and uniform as possible on this subject.
The proposals which were referre dto a sub-committee
who are to report to the Association at its session to be
held in New Orleans on October 14 and 15, 1924, are in
substance as follows:
THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Proposal 1. "In all states where the limitation on
on actions to recover land is longer than ten years, reduce
it to that period, and abolish the saving clause for persons
under disability; or in the alternative, provided a longer
limitation, say fifteen years, which would render titles ab-
solute, regardless of disability."
Pennsylvania might hesitate to adopt such a radical
change from its present rule of twenty one years in such
cases, and it would seem to be less inclined to remove the
disability clause. Indeed we would think such a change
might work a hardship in many cases. By the provisions
of the Torrens System of registering titles, as adopted by
many states, the Statue of Limitations does not run against
estates, the title to which is so registered.
LIS PENDENS
Proposal 2. Provides for a "Lis Pendens law in those
states which have no such law, providing generally that no
suit in any court shall affect the title to land unless a notice
of Lis Pendens is filled in the office of the Recorder of
Deeds."
It is said that most of the states have Lis Pendens
statutes and in the interest of uniformity and certainty, it
is desirable that such proposals should be adopted.
DEFECTIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Proposal 3. Suggests a "Statue validating defective ac-
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knowledgements that have been recorded for one year, so
worded as to cover future cases as well as past."
Might it not be possible that such a statute would cause
more trouble than it would cure, inasmuch as it would be
a question for the courts as to, the extent to which such
a rule would apply in the case of slight defects in the exe-
cution or acknowledgement of conveyances; and would not
a proposal of some uniform form of acknowledgement be
better. Besides it would seem that in certain cases it would
open the door to fraud.
CONVEYANCES BY MARRIED WOMEN
Proposal 4. "A statute permitting married persons to
convey their lands without the joinder of heir consorts,
excepting in the case of homestead; and permitting no claims
fo homestead unless a homestead is designated of record
by either husband or wife."
An amendment offered to the above is as follows: Pro-
posal 4 as amended "A statute permitting married women
to convey their lands without their husbands joining, ex-
cepting in the case of homestead, and permit no claim of
homestead to be asserted unless a homestead is designated
of record by either husband or wife."
In those states each spouce has some inchoate right to
the land of the other, it would seem as though this pro-
posal could not be accepted. Is it not true that if such
legislation were adopted it would have a tendancy to so
change the common law theory as to a marriage rights
concerning property that such proposals should not be tdop-
ted?
ABOLISHION OF DOWER
Proposal 5. "Abolish inchoate dower in states where
it still exists, or better still, abolish dower altogether, and
give a wife an interest in fee in lands of which her husband
dies seized."
If dower is to be abolished, it would be well to have
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some definite and fixed proportion of the husband's property
given to the wife in lieu of dower; but should there be
given the right to "cut her off" altogether? If not, and some
right similar to dower is adopted, would it not be necessary
to take many cases to the supreme court to find out just
what was intended by the new enactment? As to our pre-
sent dower law, most of the salient points have been passed
upon.
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGES
Proposal 7. "Shorter statutory forms of deeds and
mortgages, providing that the form shall imply all the usal
covenants."
There would seem to be no objection to a law permitt-
ing the use of such short forms, but lawyers are naturally so
conservative that it would probably be some years before
they would come into general use.
BARRING CLAIMS AGAINST UNADMINISTERED
ESTATES
Proposal 8. (as introduced): "Barring -claims against
unadministered estates, say in seven years after death." Pos-
sibly five years would be better. Proposal 8 (as amended):
"Barring claims against unadministered estates after three
years from the date of death unless letters of administra-
tion have been taken out within that period."
It is said that about one fourth of the states have a
law barring claims against unadministered estates, and it
would seem to be desirable if the other three fourthe would
follow their example and enact similar laws which would
bar such claims after a reasonable length of time.
CERTIFICATES OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Proposal 9. "Simplifying certificates of acknowledg-
ment, and abolishing separate examination of wife in states
where it is still required."
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There is no apparent reason why this recommendation
should not be adopted. There would be no more reason
fot the wife to acknowledge separate and apart from her
husband, than for the husband to acknowledge separate
and apart from his wife.
SEALS
Proposal 10. "Abolishing private seals and witnesses in
deeds and mortgages in states where they are still required.'
Many rules and adjudications have grown up concern-
ing the use of seals in connection with conveyances, and
conservative conveyancers in certain states strenuously ob-
ject to the enactment of any law that would abolish seals, but
it seems that as the original reason for using seals is gone
seals should go.
ESTATES IN FEE SIMPLE
Proposal 11. "Dispensing with the necessity for words
of inheritance to convey a fee, and that unless otherwise
specifically expressed, a deed shall convey all the estate
that the grantor had."
Most states already have enacted such a law in the
interest of uniformity the rest should 'do so without unne-
cessary delay.
JUDGMENT LIENS
Proposal 12. "A statute abolishing the blanket lien of
judgments and requiring a specific description of record of
the property sought to be held."
Suppose a person has property which cannot conveni-
ently described specifically before the rendition of judg-
ment against him, should it not be subject to the blanket
lien of the judgment? Such a statute might work against
the interests of creditors and make the collection of claims
more difficult.
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TRUSTEES' DEEDS
Proposal 13. "When a conveyance is made to a trustee
and the power of the trustee and the nature of the trust
are not disclosed of record, the trustee's deed shall convey
the full title."
Such a requirement in the statutes might have a tend-
ence to compel the recording of all the essential matters
and conditions connected with the creation of the trust,
which would be in accordance with the spirit of our re-
cording acts.
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF DIVORCED PERSONS
Proposal 14. "Make it mandatory upon a court in
granting a decree of divorce tD adjust and determine all
property rights of both parties, and in the case of real estate,
require a record of the decree in the office of the recorder
of deeds."
It would seem to be well to have a record of the de-
cree of divorce in the office of the recorder of deeds, and,
if it could be brought about, to have the court, in granting
a decree of divorce, adjust and determine all property
rights. But it might take some time to bring this about
in all the states.
LIMITING THE TIME OF ALIENATION
Proposal 15. "Limit the time during which a testator
can suspend the alienation of land, say for twenty five
years."
It is not a question whether such legislation is necessary,
and would it not tend more in uniformity to leive things as
they are with ithe "Rule against Perpetuities" in force
universally? Especially as the different phases of that
rule have been fixed by judicial determination?
While the enactment of most of the above proposals
into law would tend to simplify and unify the law, it would
seem that nothing along this line would be so beneficial
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 245
as the general adoption of the Torrens System of registra-
tion of land titles. Then too, the adoption that system
would provide an insurance of each title. Possibly that
is what the American Title Association does not want, but if
its adoption would be a benefit to the general mass of land
owners, its enactment into the statutes of the various states
should be brought about. There are always those who
are willing to work for the benefit of the classes, but gener-
ally very few work for the benefit of the masses.
ROBERT W. LYMAN.
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COMMONWEALTH VS. PIERSON
Criminal law-Dying deelarations-Evidence--Res gestae
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The victim had been shot through the thorax. Reviving from
a state of unconsciousness within half an hour. he declared that
he had been shot by "Parsons." There was no evidence that he
thought himself about to die save the gravity of the wound.
Levin, for Plaintiff.
Prowell, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Roth, J. The case of The Commonwealth against Pierson
comes to us on appeal by the defendant for a new trial, in support
of which it Is contended that the court below erred in admitting
as evidence a declaration made by the victim.
That hearsay evidence is inadmissable generally is too firmly
established to leave room for argument. It is contended how-
ever, that the declaration made in the case at bar is admissable (1)
as a dying declaration or (2) as res gestae, which are both well
recognized exceptions to the rule.
Numerous cases may be cited to show that dying declarations,
to be admissable, must be made at time when the declarant was
in actual danger of death, belived death impending and not far
distant and that death actually ensued. Kane vs Commonwealth.
109 Pa. 541. The facts of the case before us show that the victim
was certainly in danger of death and that he subsequently died.
The question for determination then Is whether he made the de-
claration believing that he was about to die. Dying declarations
cannot be received unless the statements of the deceased were
made in the belief that he was about to die. Commonwealth vs
Puntario, 271 Pa. 501. But there are numerous cases as authority
for the proposition that the declarant's belief may be inferred from
the serious nature of the wound and other circumstances. Kilpat-
rick vs. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 215, State vs. Puntario, 271 Pa. 501,
Commonwealth vs. Winkleman, 12 Sup. 497.
The important point is whether the declarant believed, or
could be inferred to believe himself in danger of death for it' is
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his belief that imports to such evidence the solemnity which Is
deemed the substitute, if not the equivalent of a Judicial oath.
The seriousness of a wound in the thorax might well have
been argued by counsel.
The scant facts before us fail to establish such an inference,
nor to our knowledge did the victim make any statements tending
to show that he was sensible of Impending death.
The wound, though probably painful, was not necessarily fatal
and hope of recovery might have been held out to him by those
attending him. On the contrary he may have been told of the grav-
ity of the wound or he might have surmised its seriousness by the
action of those about him. These points, however are properly
left for the trial court wlere the sufficiency of the proof as to the
declarant's belief, express or implied, must be decided. For the
trial court to admit the declaration without such proof would
clearly be error. Kane vs Commonwealth, 109 Pa. 541.
As falling within the exception of evidence admissable as part
of the res. gestae. The question becomes less involved. The facts
show that the declaration was made upon the victim's revival after
one half hour of unconsciousness.
The principal circumstances to be considered in determining
'whether or not statements are or or are not part of the res gestea
or thing done, are proximity in point of time and the spontaneity
of the statements.
In this case time is to be measured not from the time of the
shooting but from the time he first regained consciousness. Decla-
rations have been held admissable where made by one killed in a
mine to the first persons appearing half an hour later. Smith vs
Stone 243 Pa. 57.
As to spontaneity "statements made as soon as the declarant
has recovered consciousness may be regarded as spontaneous even
though a considerable timQ has elapsed since the principal occur-
rence." 22 C. J. 446.
No defence is offered as to whether the victim, referring in his
declaration to Parson, meant Pierson but the cases cited by the
prosecuting attorney are sufficient upon that point. upra, 271 Pa.
501.
It is clear that the disputed evidence falls well within the scope
of statements made as part of the Res Gestae and is admissable.
To decide otherwise would be to contradict much excellent aitthority.
The judgment is affirmed. Motion for new trial denied and re-
cord is ordered remitted for execution.
OPINION OF SUPREME, COURT
A declaration, in order to be a dying one, must be made with
a belief that the declarant is about to die in consequence of his
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present condition. The proof of the existence of this belief, may
be various; the victim's expressed belief of the surgeon or
physician; the doing by him, of acts which such a belief occasions,
such as sending for a priest, calling in a lawyer to make a will.
See cases in 2 Penna. Criminal Law, p. 973. The nature of the
Injury, if known to the declarant. may occasion his belief that he
is about to die. Perforation of the thorax with a pistol ball, would
be believed fatal by a large majority of men of our time and coun-
try. We think the court will properly admit the declaration as a
dying one, on the evidence before it.
The statement could also be deemed a spontaneous one. No
time, during which the mind of the deceased could have fashioned a
conception of events different from the actual, or have becone in-
fluenced by a desire to misrepresent what had actually occurred,
elapsed before the statement was made. So soon as consciousness
reawakened, the declaration was made. The interesting case of
Commonwealth v . Puntarlo. 271 Pa. 801, fully sustairn the decis-
ion of the learned court below, and. for that reason, its judgment
is AFFIRMED.
COMMONWEALTH VS. STAPTON
Criminal law-Murder-Evidence-Corpus delicti-Confession.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The deceased was found hanging to a limb of a tree in front
of his house. Defendant was accused of the hanging. Defendant
was proved to have confessed on twenty different occasions to
twenty different persons that he committed the act. He also made
two depositions in which he declared that he had hung the deceased.
Berger, for Plaintiff.
Crow for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Miss Caplin, J. It is Insisted by the Commonwealth that the
attempt of the court in charging the Jury with the duty of not con-
sidering the confessions made by the accused extrajudicially unless
independently of them they found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the hanging was not a suicide and to rule out these depositions
is in effect to force the Commonwealth to abandon the issue. It
is to be noted that the circumstances of the case left questionable
whether the deceased had hung himself or had been hung by another.
It was necessary then, for the Commonwealth to establish the corpus
delicti, that is, that the specific crime charged had actually been
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committed by someone. There is, however, no mention of any evid-'
ence that the corpus delicti was established by the Commonwealth.
This court is not only concerned as to the extent of the proof re-
quired to establish the corpus delicti but also whether evidence of
the confessions of the crime may be admitted.
Was it encumbent for the Commonwealth to prove the corpus
delicti beyond a possibility of doubt, or was it suff-icent for the
COmmonwealth to offer evidence to satisfy the Jury beyond a reason-
able doubt that the crime has been committed, or was it necessary
to establish the corpus delieti at all? 7 R. C. L on this point says
"When the Commonwealth has given sufficient evidence of the
corpus delicti to entitle the case to go to the Jury, it is competent
to show a confession made by the prisioner connecting him with
the crime. The Jury should first pass upon the sufficiency of the
evidence of the corpus delicti, and if it satisfies them beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime has been committed, then they are
at liberty to give the confession such weight as it is entitled to."
That this rule is the one adopted by the Pennsylvania courts is
indicated by the case of Gray vs. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380, which
held- "That a confession is not evidence in a capital case in ab-
sence of proof of the corpus delicti, but that fact need not be proved
beyond a possibility of doubt, and is to be found by the jury like
any other fact in the case." The court further said "When the
Commonwealth has given sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti
for the case to go to the Jury, it is competent to show a confession
made by the defendant connecting him with the crime."
The facts of Commonwealth vs. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, are similar
to the facts of the case at bar. and the court held "Where there
is evidence that the deceased committed suicide, the fact that the
crime had been committed must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
before a confession of the prisoner could be considered by the jury."
Greenleaf on Evidence, Section 217. says-- "In the United States.
the prisoner's confession, when the corpus delicti is not otherwise
proved, has been held insufficient for his conviction; and this opin-
ion certainly best accords with the humanity of the criminal code."
Hence it is best to abandon the issue than take an innocent life.
It is, therefore, the judgment of this court that the charge was not
open to objection. It is a well established principle of law that it
is necessary for the Commonwealth to establish the fact of the
commission of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before admitting
the confessions. The verdict, therefore, must be for the defend-
ant in this case.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
That a confession cannot be received In evidence, unless the
corpus delicti has been independently established. is the doctrine of
the courts of Pennsylvania. Gray v. Com., 101 Pa. 380; Com. v.
Pugliese, 276 Pa. 235. The learned court below has applied this
doctrine.
By corpus delicti is meant, not simply, the death of the de-
ceased (in a murder case) but the illegal causation of that death by
another than the dead man. There must be satisfaction of a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, of the killing, and of its feloniousness, by
somebody, before It can consider the confession as evidence of the
agency of the confessor,
The wisdom of such a rule is questioned by so high an author-
ity as Mr. Wigmore, 4 Evidence, p. 405. et seQ. The present case
illustrates its inconvenience and obstructiveness of the administra-
tion of Justice. The dead man, either hung himself, or was hung
by another. That any one should untruly confess himself the
hanger, is exceedingly improbable. False confessions of guilt "so
far as handed down to us In the annals of our courts have been
exceedingly rare." 4 Wlgmore. p. ,406. "The only real danger
and weakness in a confession-the danger of a false statement-
is o4 a slender character, and the cases of that sort are of the
rarest occurrence. No trustworthy figures of authenticated In-
stances exist; but they are concededly few." 2 Wlgmore, p. 227.
In this case twenty confessions, and two depositions, made by
him accuse the confessor of the murder. Against this evidence is
nothing. All confessions are not of equal weight, nor Is the proof
of them equal in weight. It Is rather unscientific to adopt a
rule that no confession shall be even heard, unless there is Inde-
pendent evidence that a criminal homicide has taken place. When
the killing is clear, and the only auestion is. who did it. the dead
man or another, twenty-two different confessions, self-consistent
and definite, should, it would seem, be sufficient to convict the con-
fessor when no evidence rendering Its truth improbable, is pres-
ent. As Wigmore suggests, the confession should be heard, and
its truth appraised by the Jury under the guidance of the court.
The Judgment of the learned court below is AFFIRMED.
ROPER VS. SLOCUM[
Will-Trusts and Trustees-Separate use truse--Marred women-
Act of June 4, 1879, P. L, 88
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action in ejectment for a piece of land conveyed by
A to his daughter "Mary. her heirs and assigns, to her sole and
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separate use." Mary was married at the time. Four years later she
and her husband reconveyed the land to A. Four years later A
died and by his will he gave Mary a life estate in the land, re-
mainder, one half to her son and the other to Holmes, a nephew.
Roper, the Plaintiff here, is the son's grantee and he claims the
whole of the land, as there are no other children or Issue of Mary
who is dead.
Goldstein, for Plaintiff.
Godfrey, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Samuel, J. Whether or not Roper has a just claim depends on
the answer tQ the question; What was the nature of the estate
created by a conveyance using the words, "to Mary, her heirs and
assigns, to her sole and separate use?" If the answer is that a
trust has not been created, the defendants here will be allowed to
hold the land under the above mentioned will. On the other hand
if a separate use trust has been created by these words, In Mary,
then it must follow that the reconveyance to A was void and the
will made by him has no effect on this land, thereby entitleing the
Plaintiff to his claim.
There seems to be some doubt as to Just what may have been
the intention of A, the grantor, when he conveyed to Mary. It seems
queer that If he intended to create a trust in her, he should later
accept a reconveyance of the land. But we must be governed by
the strict construction of the words, used In the conveyance,
themselves, as we have no other proof which displays a different
intent. It is my opinion therefore that these words, quoted above,
in and of themselves, created in Mary a separate use trust. This
represents the law of Pennsylvania whatever It might be elsewhere.
It was settled very early In the case of Lancaster v Dolan, I Rawle
231, and later cases such as Hays v Leonard, 155 Pa 474, and Dal-
lett v Taggart, 223 Pa. 180, continue to uphold this doctrine.
Moreover a trust created by these words in favor of a married
woman is not able to be conveyed or mortgaged during coverture,
either by her or her husband or by the joinder of both except by
means of such power as may be given under the trust Instrument
which created it, and clearly no such power Is given here. 'Mac-
Connell vs. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476. It is contended that since the
Married Womans Property Acts of 1848, 1887 and 1893 a wife, can
freely alienate any such property as may be hers both during and
after coverture. The Defendant cites Haines vs. Ellis, 24 Pa. 253 and
others which hold In substance that the act of 1848, '87, and '93 ap-
plies to both legal and Equitable estates or titles and that either
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husband or wife or both together have full power to convey their
interest in such estates. But these cas.es are inconsistent with later
rulings and the doctrine they uphold has been expressly overruled
in Penna Co. vs. Foster I Cas 134 (35 Pa. 134) and MacConnell vs
Lindsay 131 Pa. 476. These later cases hold clearly for the proposi.
tion that the acts referring to Married women's rights were only
intended to take away the Common Law dissabilitles. and have no
effect on those dissabilities arising In E uity, or as here, under
the terms of the settlement, In the form of a Use Trust. The reason
given is that a married woman should be protected against her
own improvidences as well as from those of her husband. These
cases hold further that there Is no difference between a trust Im-
plied from the separate nature of the use declared, and one expressly
creating a trust for a separate use, and since the hets mentioned
do not affect the latter, the former cannot be affected by them.
Having found that a trust was created in Mary and that the bene-
fits under it cannot be alienated by her, It follows that the recon-
veyance to the Grantor A was void. and therefore any disposition
of the land by him, whether under a will or otherwise Is of no
effect, as he had no estate In the land to dispose of.
the plaintiff here claims as grantee of Mary's only son, who
we must uphold took this land, as the only heir, and to the ex
clusion of all others, under the interstate laws. Dubbs v Dubbs
31 Pa. 144, Farries Appeal 23 Pa .29 and Rank vs Rank 120 Pa. 191.
Therefore as grantee from the one entitled to the l:nl we must
give judgment for the Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The deed to Mary, who was married, was to her "sole and Sep-
arate use." It Is well established In Pennsylvania. that during the
existence of such a trust, the married woman has no power to con-
vey the Property, unless the power to convey is expressly conferred.
Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 R. 231; 22 P. & L. Dig. Decisions; column
38480. Power to convey was not given in the deed. It did not then
exist.
That the grantee of Mary, was her father or the one who had
conveyed to her. makes no exception. Nor could she, during the
life of her husband, have devised the land. Steinmetz's Estate,
168 Pa. 175; Dallett v. Taggart, 223 Pa. 180.
It follows that A, did not own the land at the time of his death,
and that his will could not operate upon It. None could acquire
Interests in it, by his devise.
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It appears that Mary has died. The son as only heir, would own
all, but for his conveyance to Roper. Roper is the sole owner, and
should recover.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
TAYWR VS. MARSHALL
,%egUgence--Contributory negligence-Automoblies-lPedistrlI3n-
Case for jury-Ownership of Car-Evidence
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jackson, while driving negligently. inJuried Taylor. and Taylor
brings this action against Marshall, the owner of the car. It was
shown that Jackson had driven the car six times In three weeks.
An hour after the accident Jackson told Taylor's father that he
was Marshall's chauffer. Marshall excepts to the admission of this
declaration In evidence.
Heller, for Plaintiff.
Hoerle, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Irwin, J. In order that Taylor may recover In this' action vs.
Marshall for an injury caused by the negligent operation of Mar-
shall's automobile while being driven by Jackson, he must show (1)
that the car was owned by the defendant; (2) that the relation of
master and servant existed between Marshall and Jackson; (3) that
Jackson was driving the car in the course of his employment and
on his master's business. Lotz vs Hanlon 217 Pa. 339; Luckeet vs
Reighard 248 Pa. 24; Sheel vs Shaw 252 'Pa. 451 and cases there
cited.
(1) The ownership of the car is admitted to be In Marshall.
(2) The Plaintiff contends that the fact that the present driver
has been shown to have driven the car six times within three
weeks raises a presumption that he was Marshall's chauffer. How-
ever we do not feel that this is the logical presumption to be drawn
from this fact. Surely to Infer that the car was loaned Is just
as logical if not more so. In order to substantiate this inference
the plaintiff seeks to introduce the statement of Jackson made an
hour after the accident while talking to Taylor's father that he was
Marshall's chauffeur. The law looks with disfavor on untested
declarations made out of court and admits only those coming clearly
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within a recognized exception to the hear-say rule. There are two
possible grounds for admitting this declaration. (a) declaration of
a servant admissable vs his master; (b) as a part of the "res gestae."
As to (a) an agent's declarations are admitted vs. his principal only
when coming within the scope of his employment and a mere ser-
vant, having no discretionary powers can never bind his principal
by his admissions. 2 Wharton Evidence 1182 and 122 Pa. 579. Also
the relation between the declarant and the person against whom his
declaration is sought to be used must be established by affirmative
evidence other than the declaration ,of the alleged agent or servant.
22 C. J. 441. (b) In order that the declaration may be admitted as a
part of the res gestae it must be so connected with the main event
as to be a voluntary and spontaneous utterance explanatory of the
main event. The fact that an hour elapsed before the statement
was made does not bar it but it is in this case a declaration about
a collateral matter not at all explanatory of the accident. It does
not apper whether the declarant was available as a witness but
the declaration clearly should not have been admitted. This is a
reversible error as it is impossible to say just what influence this
objectionable evidence had in causing the jury to find that Jackson
was Marshall's chauffeur.
(3) Even if the relation between the two is established, Taylor is
still barred from recovering vs Marshall because of his failure to
make out (3) that Jackson was running the car in the course of
his employment on his master's business. The plaintiff contends
that the burden of disproving this is on the defendant rather than
the burden of establishing it on him. Moon vs. Mathews 227 Pa.
488. But the facts in this case differ from that case and bring
it squarely within Lotz vs. Hanlon supra- In Moon vs Mathews the
plaintiff showed that the chauffeur was driving the members of the
defendant's household and clearly not on an independent errand of
his own. Here the judge properly ruled that the burden of disprov-
ing that the chauffeur was acting in the course of his employment
was on the defendant. In this case no such circumstances are
shown and the case is clearly within Lotz vs. Hanlon.
Since the excepted declaration should not have been admitted,
and since the plaintiff fails to show that Jackson was Marshall's
chauffeur, and that if so that he was acting within the course of
his employment on Marshall's business, the plaintiff cannot recover
vs. the defendant and the lower court must be reversed.
The case is remanded to the lower court with instructions to
enter Judgment for the defendant.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Marshall was not in the automobile, when the accident occurred.
He owned it. But, ownership of the automobile does not make
the owner liable for all injuries, In the causing of which it may
have been instrumental. Jackson might have had the vehicle
without authority of Marshall. Surely in such a case, Marshall
could not be responsible.
Even if Jackson had the authority to have the automobile the
liability of Marshall would not follow. He might have lent it; for
compensation or gratuitously, and be irresponsible for Jackson's act.
Crouse v. Lubin, 260 Pa. 329, 332.
To make the defendant liable, it would be necessary that Jack-
son was acting for him, as his agent, at the time. He might have
been generally employed as chauffeur and on this occasion have been
working the car for himself or another, not fo his employer who
in that case, would not be responsible; Crouse v. Lubin, supra.
Had it appeared that Jackson was employed as chauffeur, we
might legitimately infer that on this occasion, he was acting as
such in the absence of specific evidence.
AWhat then, was the evidence that Jackson was the defendant's
chauffeur? That he was, might be shown by circumstances, 'as in
Kurtz v. Tourlson, 241 Pa. 425; Hoskins v. Peoples, 42 Super.
611, 616. The circumstances relied on here to prove the agency,
are the six occasions within three weeks when Jackson was oper-
ating the automobile. Perhaps these facts would alone justify the
inference of agency, coupled with the fact that the vehicle did not
belong to him, but belonged to Marshall. Jackson may have bor-
rowed it, but, as the car was not kept for hire, so far as appears,
this is a less likely hypothesis than that of agency.
The additional evidence of the agency, is the declaration of
Jackson that he was Marshall's chauffeur. Ordinarily the fact that
B is the agent of A cannot be established by the unsworn assertions
of B, but some proof of the agency being in the case, these asser-
tions may be heard Inr corroboration. Hoskins v. Peoples. 42 Super,
611; Stewart v. Climax Co., 200 Pa. 611; Henry's Penna. Trial
Evidence, 83.
Jackson's declaration could not be received as a part of the res
gestae. It was made a very short time after the accident, but
where it was made does not appear. A change of place would de-
tract from the evidence of its spontaneity upon the assumption of
which, only, would it be admissible.
Despite the careful opinion of the learned court below, we are
constrained to reach a different conclusion. The proven facts make
us think the agency of the operator of the car that of a chauffeur
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for the defendant, in all probability, and probability, is a basis of
decision.
REVERSED. Judgment for Plaintiff.
HOLLISTER VS. F. & M. BANK
Checks-Forgery-Condonation of previous forgeries-Inference of
Authority of forger to sign Cheek.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hollister kept his funds in the defendant bank.
A clerk of his drew without authority, in the name
of Hollister, three cheeks for $50. $150, and $175. This act was con-
doned by Hollister. The clerk ,then drew a check for $500. The
bank seeing that Hollister had not disputed the propriety of forging
the earlier checks, paid this one. Hollister, on learning of it, dis-
charged the clerk and 'refused to allow the bank to take credit
against his account for payment. Suit against the bank for $500.
Mundy, for Plaintiff.
Mutzabaugh, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Nichols, J. As far as I am able to discover this type of case
has never been decided in Pennsylvania.
The cases cited by both the counsel differ in many respects
from the case now before the court. In none of them does the
question of previous similar acts being condoned arise, the only
question is what duty the party is under to give the Bank notice of
the forgeries, so that we can only take the law as it is laid down
in other Jurisdictions in cases similar to this one.
I do not think that the previous forgeries and the fact that
they were condoned can be brought in and set up as defense by
the defendant, for the reason that it is not the money paid on those
forged checks that the plaintiff seeks to recover. The defendant
has said that by these acts they were led to believe that payment
of the last check would be alright, since Hollister had said nothing
concerning the paying of the other ones. But it seems that the bank
could have very easily discovered that the acts of the clerk were
unauthorized and that the checks were forged if they had made In-
quiry, and since they must have known that a bank Is, liable for
all money paid out on forged checks, this could be considered as
contributory negligence on their part.
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These previous acts were all condoned at one time and thus
this was but one ratification of an unauthorized act of the agent
and a single ratification is hardly sufficient to set up an estoppel
of the principal from denying the clerks authority.
As I have- mentioned above Hollister is suing only for the money
paid on the last check and the facts indicate that he notified the
bank of this last act, and so gave them the oppurtunity to proceed
against the forger himself to recover what they had paid out. This
last act being considered a separate and distinct one, and the bank
having notice of it, they were not put in any such position that
the loss would fall upon them, if they proceeded against the forger
immediately.
It Is reasonable to believe that Hollister, after the condona-
tion of the first three acts, believed that no other forgeries would
be committed, and while it might be said that notification to the
bank to refrain from paying any checks signed by the clerk, for
a bank is presumed to know and ascertain the genuineness of its
depositors' signatures, would have protected both Hollister and
the bank, yet since the suit is not brought for them we can see no
reason for basing a decision upon them.
We think it is for the defendant to make out a prima facia
case by showing, if he can, in what way the condonation of those
previous forgeries, and failure to notify him, has caused him any
loss or damage. Thus far they have not shown this, and since
they have a right of action in which they can recover the money
paid out, we cannot see why the plaintiff should bear this loss.
For the reasons above stated Judgment must be entered in this
court for the plaintiff for $500, and the case dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has found it too irksome to present the
facts on which the case turns. Hereafter we shall have to reject
an opinion that is not preceded by the statement that was handed
down.
Three checks were without authority signed by the clerk with
the name of his employer, Hollister. These signatures were forger-
ies. Hollister, for some reason chose not to dispute the right of
the bank to pay them. The bank may, not unwarrantably have in-
ferred that the clerk had authority from Hollister, to draw the.
checks, and it is quite unusual for a man to allow three forgeries
costing him $50, $150, and $175, to be committed without complain-
ing to the bank, and without dismissing from his employ the forger.
If the bank paid the fourth check under the belief that the clerk
was authorized, a belief arising from the apparent acquiescence of
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Hollister, we think he cannot complain of the payment of the 4th
check. Hollister should have known what inference the bank
would naturally draw from his past conduct.
This is not a case of knowledge of three forgeries and of the
assumption by the bank, that a fourth forgery would be condoned.
It is rather a case of inference of authority in the clerk, caused by
the apparent approval of his act on three earlier occasions. As
Paxson, J., says. in Cohen v. Teller, 93 Pa. 123: "It would be a
harsh rule to hold that a man who had paid one or more forged
notes to save the honor of the makers, thereby rendered himself
liable upon all other forged paper which the makers may have
issued." But, inferring that a 4th signature was made with the au-
thority of the bearer of the name, from the fact that he had without
demur, treated three other signatures as authorized Is a different
matter.
We think Hollister having betrayed the bank into the payment
of the check, cannot now dispute the propriety of the payment.
JUDGMENT REVTERSED.
HOFFER VS. JENIS
Slander-Truth of statements-as a Defense--Evidence--Reputation
of Plaintiff in a distant community four years previous to the
Slander.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action of slander charging Hoffer with dishonesty.
Jenks, in mitigation of damages, called three witnesses who testi-
fied that five years before the utterance of the alleged slander. Hof-
fer had lived for four years at a place ten miles distant from his
present home where the slander was uttered and that he then and
there had a bad reputation for dishonesty. This evidence was ad-
mitted. A verdict was given for Hoffer for $100.00. This Is an
appeal from that decision.
McQuaide, for Plaintiff.
McKeown, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Martin. J. Upon reading the facts two Questions present them-
selves for our discussion: May the bad reputation of the plaintiff be
used to mitigate damages? Was the testimony of the Witnesses ad-
missible?
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It is well settled in Pennsylvania that in an action for slander
where the plea of not guilty is pleaded, either alone or in conjunct-
ion with a Plea of justification, the defendant may show in miti-
gation of damages the general bad reputation of the plaintiff for
the particular thing with which he is charged by the plaintiff.
Trickett-Character Evidence In Civil Cases in 8 Dickinson Law
Review, page 173. Brown vs. Allen, 91 Pa. 383.
The reason for the above rule is that if the plaintiff had a
bad reputation concerning matters, he could not be injured as much
as if he had a good reputation when he Is accused by the defend-
ant. If he had no reputation he could not lose anything if that
reputation was assailed.
We must next consider whether the testimony of the witnesses
as to the plaintiff's reputation five years ago, and ten miles distant
from his present home. was properly admitted.
In order that a former reputation may be admitted, the same
reputation must exist from the time when the witnesses testified,
that it was bad. down to the date of the slander. In the case at
bar, there is no evidence as to what was Hoffer's reputation at his
former home at the time when the alleged slanderous statements
were made. Parkhurst vs. Ketchum, 87 Mass. 406. Commonwealth
vs. White. 271 Pa. 584.
The reputation at the former place is too remote in time and
distance. It is too remote in time for it would be folly to maintain
that a reputation established five years ago at a distance where he
lived for only four years should follow him to his grave. Perhaps
his true character is not deserving of such a bad reputation for some
abnormal circumstance might have prompted the formation of such
a reputation, and he did not live there long enough to give the
people a chance to form a different opinion of him.
It is too remote in distance as his former Place of abode was
in another community and it cannot be presumed that that reputa-
tion extended to the community where he now resides, thus permit-
ting defendant to argue that that reputation still exists in his
present place of domicile. In Miller vs filler, 187 Pa. 572, it wag
held that evidence as to the credibility of a witness which relates
to a period four years prior to the trial is too remote.
Greenleaf states In Book 1. page 585 that evidence as to reputa-
tion at any preceeding time is admissible provided it Is not too
remote in time to have real probative value but he considers only
cases in the same community.
The facts in the case of Hopkins vs Tate, 285 Pa. 56 are some-
what similar to the case at bar. In that case the defendant pro-
duced evidence of the plaintiff's bad reputation in that same neigh-
borhood eleven years prior to the slander. It was held that it Is the
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reputation In the neighborhood in which he resides at the time the
slander was uttered and not in the community from which the
party has moved many years prior thereto. which has been attack-
ed and injured. This rule is now followed in Pennsylvania and
almost every other state in the Union. Smith vs Hine, 179 Pa.
203: Mansfield Coal and Coke Co vs. McEnery, 91 Pa. 185. For rule
in other states, see 1 Greenleaf, page 585.
In view of the foregoing discussions the evidence should not
have been admitted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The action Is for defamation. Its object Is to recover compen.
sation for thb injury to the reputation of the plaintiff.
If the thing imputed is true, the plaintiff Is not entitled to the
reputation of not having done it. In a civil action, the truth of the
imputation can always be shown. Press Co. v. Stewart, 119 Pa.
584, 602. "The truth of the charge," says Jaggard, "is a full jus-
tification In a civil action for defamation." 1 Torts, 521.
In this case no effort is made to show that the plaintiff did not
deserve the reputation from which the slander detracted. Rather,
the purpose is to show that the plaintiff has not suffered a maxi-
mum injury from the impairment of his reputation, by showing
that it was already bad.
Some cases assume that one where reputation Is already bad,
cannot suffer as much injury from a given slander, as he would,
bad his reputation been good. This is not self-evident. The worse
a man's existing reputation is, the more important it may be to
him, that It shall not be further impaired. The bad reputation al-
ready existing facilitates the public's belief of the new aspersion.
A reputation may be so good that people will not even suspect
that a charge of wrong-doing is true, whereas, If it Is already bad,
the impression of the new charge Is deepened.
But in this case the attempt is to show that the plaintiff has
not suffered as much injury from the slander, as otherwise, because
at a place 10 miles distant from the place where the slander was
uttered during the interval between 9 years and 5 years before its
utterance, his reputation for dishonesty was band. Hav-
ing a bad reputation at one place or one time. does not warrant
the shattering of a good reputation at another place and time. In
Hopkins v. Tate, 255 Pa. 56, it was held that a bad reputation 11
years before the slander sued for, could not be shown to lessen the
damages in the action for slander. We think that an interval of
5 years between the prevalence of the bad reputation (especially if
it was in another locality) and the utterance of the slander pre-
cludes the use of that earlier evil reputation.
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A bad reputation may be unjust. One who has acquired it in
ene place, must not be hindered in the formation of a better repu-
tation in another place. Even if the earlier reputation correspond-
ed -with thd facts of conduct and character, the subject must be
Iermitted, by a better life, to create a better reputation.
We think it error to have admitted the evidence and thus to
have reduced the damages.
Trial court's judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
COMMONWEALTH VS. PARSONS
Criminal Law-3Murder---Charge to jury-Failure to instruct as to
degree Act March 31, 1860 P. L. 402.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant is indicted for murder. There was evidence that
Parsons, in robbing a store, fired a pistol at the proprietor, in the
store, killing him. The court told the jury the difference between
the degrees of murder, and that they were to decide (a) whether
Parsons did the killing, and (b) did so while robbing; if they so de-
cided. they decided him guilty in the first degree, and they should
so state. Verdict guilty in the first degree. Motion for a new
trial.
Nichols, for Defendant.
Monheit, for Commonwealth.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Mundy, J. Parsons, the jury having decided he committed a
murder while robbing, was guilty of murder in the first degree,
as defined, by the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 372, p. 74, which
reads: "All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison,
or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killing or which shall be committed in the perpetra-
tion of, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burg-
lary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree, and all other kinds
of murder, shall be deemed murder of the second degree; an-1 the
jury before whom any person indicted for murder shall be tried,
shall , if they find such person guilty thereof4 ascertain in their
verdict whether it be murder of the first degree or second degree;
but if such person be convicted by confession, the court shall pro-
ceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the
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crime, and to give sentence accordingly." The jury then should
have stated that the accused was guilty of murder in the first de-
gree; but the court should have stated that it was the jury's duty
to ascertain the degree of his guilt. By its failure even to intimate
such duty, the learned court below committed reversible error for
such omission deprived the accused of one of his statutory rights,
namely, the right to have the degree of his guilt ascertained by
the jury. Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. 396; Lane v. Common-
wealth, 59 Pa. 371; Commonwealth v. Fellows, 212 Pa. 297; Com-
monwealth v. Ferko, 269 Pa. 39. However vehemently it may
be argued that a judge can not err by peremptorily instructing a.
jury to do that which they ought to do, the latter part of the act Is
as ineluctible as the former.
It is possible then in cases involving this act for a jury to re-
turn a second degree verdict when the conduct of the accused has
incontrovertibly amounted to that which is clearly defined as mur-
der of the first degree. Such a possibility must have been antici-
pated by the framers of the act. But its purpose has been sub-
served--a higher degree of punishment has been affixed to heinous
murders, and the consciences of sensitive jurors have been relieved.
Because of the insufficiency of the abstractly correct charge of
the court below, we grant a new trial.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
It is rather shocking to read in Commonwealth v. Ferko. 269
Pa. 39, that the jury should be advised, in a murder case, that the
statute expressly imposes on them the duty of fixing the degree of
murder "no matter what was charged or proved by the Common-
wealth," They had the undoubted power to fix a lower degree for
the crime than the statute itself provides."
The jury has power to do things, for the doing of which there is
no redress. It may refuse to convict of violations of law, and there
Is no remedy. But, it Is odd indeed, for a law-maker to take pains
to say the act X is murder of the first degree, and X
minus Y is murder of the second degree, but the jury may,
as a normal part of its duty, say that the doer of X, has not been
guilty of murder in the first degree. It Is odd for an appellate
court to encourage juries to disregard their duty under the law, by
nullifying decisions of the trial court, which has told them that
they should, if certain facts exist, find the person of whom they
are predicable, to be guilty of that of which the legislature has
said he is guilty.
Killing in perpetrating a robbery, "shall be deemed murder of
the first degree." Shall be deemed by whom? By the newspaper
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writer; or the publicist, or the lawyer, or the Judge, but not by
the Jury? Incredible. It Is the duty of the jury to think and say
that one who has thus killed another, is guilty of murder of the
first degree. When the statute proceeds to say "And the jury
* * * * shall, if they find the accused guilty thereof (guilty of what?)
ascertain in their verdict whether it be murder of the first or of the
second degree." surely this means, if they find the malicious kill-
ing, in robbery, that they shall understand and say that the accused
is guilty of murder of the first degree. That the legislature took
pains to classify malicious killings, and their punishments, and yet
intended that Juries should be encouraged to annul the classifica-
tion, by reporting in their verdict that the accused, though found
to have killed in robbing, is guilty of murder of the second degree,
is extremely difficult to believe.
The decisions are doubtless attributable to the horror of being
instrumental in the putting of the guilty to death. That horror is
sufficiently vigorous, among jurors, to betray them into the rendi-
tion of false verdicts. It Is to be lamented that the trial court
cannot impose on them the duty of executing the law; and that it is
even a reversible error to refrain from telling the jury that though
the law defines the facts which they derive from the evidence, they
may, if they choose, refuse to apply the definition, and return what
was murder of the first degree, as murder of the second.
But some decisions have avoided this solecism. C. F. Shaff-
ner v. Com., 72 Pa. 60; McMeen v. Com., 114 Pa. 300, Cf. dis-
senting opinion of Mitchell, C. J.
Unsatisfactory as the decisions in Com. v. Fellows, 262 Pa.
297, Com. v. Ferko, 269 Pa. 39 are, it is prudent to follow them, until
their doctrine is modified or rescinded. For this reason the judg-
ment of the learned court below is AFFIRMED.
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BOOK REVIEW
Cases on Equity, Vol. 1. By Walter Wheeler Cook. Professor
of Law, in Yale University. Published by the West Publishing Com-
pany, St. Paul, Minn.
This is the first of a three volume case-book on Equity. The
second volume is to be devoted, in large part, to the specific per-
formance of contracts. The third will treat of reformation, resciss-
ion and restitution at law. and in equity. Of the first volume,
the author says the cases and other selections "are intended to of-
fer material for an introductory course in equity;" to manifest the
historical development of equity in England and America, to dis-
cover what caused the creation of equity law as a separate system;
what its kinds of remedies are; what. the results of the modern fu-
sion of common law and equity are; the truth of the maxim that
equity acts in personam in contrast with the common law, which
acts in rem.
Many of the cases deal with the fundamental rules governing
the exercise of the powers of the courts of equity; and consider the
principle that the remedy at law must be inadequate; that when
equity takes jurisdiction it will give complete relief. Cases are
given In which equitable relief is denied, even when the law reme-
dy is inadequate.
Chapter 1 contains a historical introduction, exhibiting the rise
and development of equity jurisdiction. This is a valuable sum-
mary.
The collection contains many valuable cases, and also extracts
from the writings of well known authorities. It cannot fall to
prove useful to a practitioner, and to be adaptable to the needs of
the instructor and the student, in law schools.
